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DLD-171        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 17-1016 
___________ 
 
JASON BROWN, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
PETE FILOPOULOS, Pete’s Pizza 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-16-cv-06349) 
District Judge:  Honorable Timothy J. Savage 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or  
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 23, 2017 
Before:  CHAGARES, VANASKIE and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: May 2, 2017) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Appellant Jason Brown, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order 
dismissing his action sua sponte as frivolous for not meeting the requirements of Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a).  Because we conclude that this appeal presents no 
substantial question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.  See 3d Cir. 
LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.1 
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a complaint must provide “a short and 
plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”  Pursuant to 
that rule, a complaint’s “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief 
above the speculative level.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).  
The District Court properly concluded that Brown’s Complaint does not meet this 
standard.  Rather, the Complaint contains only a one-sentence conclusory accusation 
regarding “peonage work ethics” and “forced labor” that is so vague that it does not 
suggest Brown is entitled to relief.2 
Moreover, when a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, the District Court must 
dismiss his complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.  See 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  When dismissing a complaint for failure to state a claim 
under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the standard is the same as under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) – 
                                              
1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We may summarily affirm a District 
Court’s order if the appeal presents no substantial question.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 
I.O.P. 10.6.   
2 We further note that, in addition to seeking monetary damages, Brown pursued a 
“criminal record expungement,” which bears no rational relationship to his peonage 
accusation. 
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namely, where a complaint has not alleged sufficient facts to state a claim for relief that is 
“plausible on its face[,]” dismissal is appropriate.  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 
(2009).  Brown’s Complaint is vague and implausible on its face. 
Brown’s argument in support of his appeal does not remediate his deficient 
Complaint.  Rather, it is a jumbled amalgam of unsupported accusations against Appellee 
– the owner of a pizza shop for whom, apparently, Brown was once a delivery driver.  
Brown accuses Appellee of being a trade secret thief operating in “syndication.”  Next, 
Brown states that Appellee is a “traditional slave master” who “wants to be [a] god[].”  
Brown suggests that Appellee was involved in “dual-citizenship coercion,” instituted a 
“religious environment” through Touchpoint computer software, and “programm[ed] the 
employees as far as enhancement for production.”  Brown contends that all of Appellee’s 
“legacy systems” operate in unison as “scholarship” to “structure misrepresentation, 
fraud, incompetence, dissatisfaction, coercion, disrespect, fault, error, and 
discrimination.”  Brown asserts that the Appellee has a “nobility” that goes against 
“moral excellence.”  Finally, Brown appears to concede that his complaint was presented 
to the District Court “as rambling and unclear to only [sic] needing to be decoded.”  
These arguments reinforce the failure of the Complaint to state any viable claim. 
In addition, the District Court did not err in concluding that allowing Brown to 
amend his Complaint would be futile.  See Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 
2004).  Brown’s implausible allegations underscore that it would be pointless to allow 
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him to amend.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 112-13 (3d Cir. 
2002). 
For these reasons, we conclude that this appeal presents no substantial question.  
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order dismissing Brown’s 
complaint.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  Brown’s motion for a hearing is denied. 
